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THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION: THE
BLURRED LINE BETWEEN MEDIATORY
AND JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS
Lewis M. Gill*
M Y TOPIC COVERS various aspects of a single question:
Should the arbitration process be viewed as an extension of
the grievance procedure, with informal hearings and with the ar-
bitrator alert to detect and encourage any openings for resolution
of the case by agreement, or should it be viewed as a more formal
and judicial proceeding, influenced if not governed to a large ex-
tent by the rules of evidence, with the arbitrator vigorously con-
ducting the hearings much as a judge would in a court of law?
The various aspects of this central question raise many other
questions. One such question is: What kind of judge and what
kind of court proceeding is appropriate?
A simple example illustrates the wide ranging possibilities.
For instance, a judge in a murder trial conducts a proceeding
which differs greatly from a proceeding which presents the issue
of whether to grant an injunction in a very hot local strike (such
as one on the transit system). In the latter case, the judge almost
always will call the parties into his chambers and hammer out a
settlement, using all the clubs of mediation he can think of. This
would be unthinkable in the murder trial.
It is also necessary to define what kind of arbitration we are
talking about. I am not going to talk about interest arbitration
cases (i.e., cases deciding the terms of a new contract). That is an
entirely different ball game, and mediation is virtually unavoida-
ble if you are going to do any kind of a job with it. Also, I am not
* President, National Academy of Arbitrators, 1971; First Permanent Arbitrator, Ma-
jor League Baseball, 1970-1972; Chairman, President Nixon's Railroad Board, 1970;
Member, President Johnson's Railroad Board, 1964; Member, President Johnson's Airline
Board, 1963; Member, President Kennedy's Aircraft Board, 1962; Member, National War
Labor Board, 1944-1945; Chairman, Cleveland Regional War Labor Board, 1942-1943.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
going to talk about arbitrations under permanent umpireships be-
cause they are quite different from ad hoc arbitration due to the
lack of a continuing relationship between the arbitrator and the
parties.
My remarks will deal solely with the ad hoc type of grievance
arbitration, and even as to that, I will skip over situations in which
the parties have jointly made it very clear to the arbitrator, either
explicitly or otherwise, how they want the proceedings to be con-
ducted. In such cases, the arbitrator will be well advised to con-
form to the parties' wishes. Nevertheless, there can be exceptions.
For example, where the proceedings are getting badly out of hand,
the obvious need for intervention by the arbitrator may justify
deviation from the parties' procedural ground rules. I am often
reminded of the saying of the first chairman of the War Labor
Board, William H. Davis, who remarked: "There are exceptions to
every rule, including this one."
So much for my preliminary reservations and disclaimers. I
now turn to my selected topic.
There was, in the early days after the War Labor Board, a
very lively clash between what were often called the Wayne
Morse School and the George Taylor School. Wayne Morse, a
former professor of law and an outspoken public member of the
War Labor Board (and later an even more outspoken Senator
from Oregon) had arbitrated numerous disputes on the West
Coast waterfront before the war. The turbulent relationships be-
tween the parties in that bare-knuckle environment had doubtless
convinced him that only a firm grip by the arbitrator, in a strictly
judicial proceeding, could ensure a reasonably orderly and worka-
ble modus operandi. That kind of process also suited his personal
style, which was not entirely unlike that of a lion tamer. At any
rate, he took a dim view of the efficacy of any mediatory efforts by
the arbitrator. In general, he had the support of Noble Braden,
Vice-President of the American Arbitration Association, in that
point of view.
The George Taylor School essentially viewed the central pur-
pose of the arbitration process as one of nurturing the collective
bargaining process and encouraging, whenever possible, a healthy
working relationship between the management and the union.
Two comments by George Taylor stand out in my memory: One,
that the decision in a case should, if possible, not come as a sur-
prise to either party; and, two, that the arbitrator served the par-
ties well when he was able to develop a "consent to lose" on the
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part of the side which was destined to be the loser. As to that last
objective, I think he was talking primarily about continuing
umpireships because one rarely has time to go into that sort of
thing with ad hoc arbitration.
To summarize, Morse and Braden believed that the arbitra-
tor's role was simply to decide the case put before him and let the
parties deal with their relationship, without any kind of unsolic-
ited help from the arbitrator. The opposite viewpoint was held by
Taylor. He believed that the arbitrator, absent any clear mandate
from the parties to the contrary, should view the case in the con-
text of the overall good of the parties' relationship and do every-
thing he sensibly could to handle the hearing, and the decision, so
as to nurture that relationship. Needless to say, Taylor's approach
favored mediatory efforts by the arbitrator whenever such efforts
appeared feasible. Though risking over-simplification, I think the
essential core of the difference between the two approaches is
fairly stated.
Now, having spent much of my allotted time in describing
the question I wish to discuss, what about the answer? My strong
impression (although I cannot document it) is that, in the last
forty-seven years, the distance between the Morse-Braden ap-
proach and the Taylor approach has shortened drastically, and
that practical experience in grievance arbitration has steadily soft-
ened and smoothed the hard edges of the original positions. The
reasons behind this wholesome development are many, but the
principal reason is that the advocates and the arbitrators have
come to know each other, and therefore know what to expect of
each other.
Many of the issues which sharply focused the difference be-
tween the two schools have been thoroughly examined, and gener-
ally accepted principles have emerged. For example, in the early
days it was fairly common to spend an ill-tempered hour or so
arguing over which side had the burden of putting on its case first.
Ralph Seward tells of a very early case of his where neither side
would budge on the issue of who goes first. He finally broke the
stalemate by deciding that he would go first. He began asking
questions as to the nature of the case, gradually working the dis-
cussions around to the point where one side reluctantly agreed to
go forward. By now it is pretty well established that management
goes first on disciplinary cases and the union goes first on most
other cases, and it is quite rare to have an extended argument on
that subject.
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Another (quite serious) conflict, which has cooled off a great
deal since the early days, is the applicability of the rules of evi-
dence. Most notable is the rule concerning hearsay testimony. It is
still fairly common to hear lawyers object on grounds of hearsay.
They do not, however, press those objections with much vigor and
confidence. I would comment here that many objections on hear-
say grounds miss the mark entirely, even on what I remember of
the rules of evidence.' For example, assume that a superintendent
is asked why he fired Jones, the grievant. The superintendent be-
gins to answer by saying: "Well, the foreman rushed in and told
me that Jones was refusing a direct order to perform the work." If
the lawyer (or nonlawyer) representing the union objects that this
is hearsay, the objection can usually be brushed aside quickly by
pointing out that it is not hearsay as to what the foreman told the
superintendent, though of course it is hearsay as to whether Jones
actually did refuse to do the work.
At this point I am going to more directly address the Taylor
vs. Morse and Braden dispute. I quote from a letter from Profes-
sor Sharpe suggesting that I address this question: "Why did the
following confident prediction of George Taylor not come to
pass?" He then quotes an early article by George Taylor:
I have no hesitancy in expressing a conviction that, as collective
bargaining matures and as cooperative relationships supplant
"arm's length" dealings, organized labor and management will
tend to choose the impartial chairman type of procedure. In
other words, they will desire mediation in arbitration. I also be-
lieve these parties will tend increasingly to use the services of
permanent chairmen rather than ad hoc arbitrators.2
Professor Sharpe's list of suggested subjects also asks a related
series of questons:
Why did the quasi-judicial approach to arbitration prevail? Is it
related to evolution of the collective bargaining agreement it-
self? Skeletal vs. detailed? Was the problem-solving approach
ever dominant? Popular? In what kinds of cases? If so, why did
it decline? Were the parties dissatisfied with the arbitrator as
problem-solver?
I think ad hoc arbitration has developed along quasi-judicial
1. I gave a talk a while ago on the joys of being an aging arbitrator, and one of them
was that you could say: "It's been so long since I went to law school that I don't remember
the rules of evidence very well, and have to rely on common sense."
2. Taylor, Further Remarks on Grievance Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 92, 94 (1949).
[Vol. 39:545
NATURE OF ARBITRATION
lines with little enthusiasm for mediation as such. (I am coming
to a definition of what I mean by mediation "as such.") There are
a number of reasons for this development.
For instance, the parties have become more sophisticated and
comfortable in arbitration hearings. Therefore, they generally de-
sire less input from the arbitrators. Secondly, the more detailed
contracts prevalent today leave fewer areas for the arbitrator to
fill. Therefore, there is less interest in getting an arbitrator's input
on policy questions.
One factor overlooked by George Taylor is that there were
few men during the early years of arbitration who, like George
Taylor and Harry Shulman, had the rare gift for inspiring man-
agement and union leaders to have confidence in their ability to
make an effective contribution to the relationship. John Dunlop
has, at times, made the same doubtful assumption (i.e. that many
arbitrators have the same gifts as he and can do the same things
that he can). Of the handful who may be said to have demon-
strated that special gift over the long haul, two of them are sitting
up here today, Syl Garrett and Ben Aaron. The other member of
this distinguished panel, Jack Day, probably could have joined
that elite fraternity. However, after a flashy start in arbitration,
he got sidetracked into practicing law, running for Congress, and
becoming a judge, thus becoming the only one of us who can
speak from personal experience as to the relative mind-sets of
judges and arbitrators. The only distinction I can claim is the du-
bious honor of having the largest number of former permanent
umpireships (in several of these the parties have since abandoned
the permanent umpire system altogether).
That suggests another possible explanation of why there has
not been the growth in permanent umpireships which Taylor envi-
sioned. Only those major umpireships where the early incumbents
were men who could inspire confidence in the system have sur-
vived. There are numerous examples: Taylor at General Motors,
Shulman at Ford, Garrett at U.S. Steel, and Ralph Seward at
Bethlehem Steel. In sum, permanent umpireships have not prolif-
erated because the arbitrators, even though generally competent,
lacked that special gift.
Another suggestion from Professor Sharpe's letter: "In your
experience did the steelworkers' trilogy, particularly Justice Doug-
las' characterization of arbitration in United Steelworkers of
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America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,3 noticeably pro-
mote one view of arbitration over the other?"
I don't think that Justice Douglas' rather elaborate comments
on the allegedly vast expertise of arbitrators really had much ef-
fect. Most arbitrators felt that he overstated our so-called exper-
tise. Warrior and Gulf did discourage appeals to the Court, for a
while at least, but I don't think it had any real effect on the type
of arbitration procedures.
The next item here, number four on Professor Sharpe's list,
asks: "Has your experience been more problem-solving or quasi-
judicial?"
The answer is that for me, the ad hoc proceedings have been
much more quasi-judicial, but with heavy doses of what might be
called quasi-mediatory efforts.
That brings me to a happy memory. In the mid-1950's,
IRRA in Philadelphia scheduled what was billed as a debate be-
tween me and Noble Braden on the question: "Should an arbitra-
tor mediate?" It developed into something of an anti-climax, I am
happy to report. It turned out that we had very little in the way of
disagreement between us, and that most of the shouting on the
question involved misunderstandings as to what constituted "me-
diation" in an arbitration hearing. I had prepared a series of sce-
narios for the debate which I will share with you, with a little
updating and editorial license.4
Case No. 1. The grievant is discharged for theft. The com-
pany seeks to introduce the grievant's past record of warnings and
suspensions for other offenses - absenteeism, poor performance,
and insubordination - asserting that it is relevant if only as bear-
ing on the credibility of grievant's denial of the theft. The union
objects because this prior record was never mentioned in the pre-
arbitration steps of the grievance procedure and because it has no
relevance to the theft charges. If the evidence is permitted, the
union says it will demand another day of hearing to investigate
and rebut that evidence.
Is it "mediation" for the arbitrator to call a sidebar confer-
ence with the two spokesmen and try to work out some agreed
method of handling this problem, perhaps via offers of proof? I
3. 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960).
4. These scenarios, incidentally, are not at all hypothetical. They are drawn from
actual experience, and frequently these sidebar efforts have borne some fruit, at least in
reducing the length of the hearing.
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think not, although it probably could be described as "procedural
mediation."
Case No. 2. The grievant was given a two-day suspension for
careless workmanship. At the hearing, the grievant and his fore-
man give conflicting and uncertain testimony as to the charge of
carelessness, both as to the triggering incident and as to several
previous incidents. Each side seems determined to put on several
witnesses as to each of these incidents. The union is demanding to
have the company produce records of other employees who assert-
edly produced equally poor work without being disciplined. A sec-
ond or even third day of hearings appears likely if all of these
matters are explored.5 The arbitrator calls for a sidebar caucus
with the spokesman for each side and asks whether the two-day
suspension is important enough to warrant the time and expense
that will result. He suggests that they may want to discuss it with
each other in his absence and see if they can come up with some
way of disposing of this grievance without prejudice. The arbitra-
tor makes it clear, however, that he is perfectly willing to go
ahead with the hearings and decision if that's what the parties
want to do.
Is this "mediation," and if so, is it inappropriate conduct by
the arbitrator? I don't think it is, and in many cases it has re-
sulted in resolving the grievance.
Case No. 3. As a variation on the above, suppose the arbitra-
tor calls the spokesmen aside before the testimony begins and asks
whether they have personally discussed the case with each other
before the hearing, and if not, whether there is any useful purpose
to be served by their doing so now in the absence of the arbitrator.
I would rarely have done this thirty or even fifteen years ago, but
I do it fairly often now, especially when there is some suspicion
that they might welcome such an inquiry. It has often turned out
that one or both of the spokesmen are delighted to have the ques-
tion raised, having been hesitant to raise it themselves for fear of
suggesting a lack of confidence in the strength of their respective
cases.
Case No. 4. At the hearing, the discharged grievant testifies
with obvious bitterness about the impossible relationship he has
with management. He claims management is determined to get
5. In the early days, when some of us were hurting for business, we would be de-
lighted with the prospect of a second or third day of hearings, but it's not quite so appeal-
ing as you get older.
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rid of him. Is it appropriate for the arbitrator to call a caucus and
ask the union spokesman if the grievant really wants to return to
that kind of hopeless relationship or is he just seeking to clear his
record and get some backpay so he can then quit?
The union spokesman may indicate that this might be worth
exploring if the company is willing to make an offer of some suita-
ble cash settlement, labeled as "severance pay." And the company
spokesman, eager to avoid a possible reinstatement of the griev-
ant, may indicate that he is willing to explore that idea. The arbi-
trator then bows out of the discussions. In a number of cases, this
has resulted in a cash settlement without reinstatement, presuma-
bly a result the arbitrator could not have reached by way of a
decision (at least I have never heard of a case where an arbitrator
decided a case on that basis).
Case No. 5. The fifth, and last, scenario involves what may
be called a "procedural problem." The company has refused to
pay report-in pay to some dozen employees who arrived at the
plant during a snowstorm. They had not heard a company an-
nouncement on the radio nor received telephone notification that
the plant was going to be closed down that day. The arbitrator
suggests, in a caucus or perhaps in the open hearing, that instead
of hearing the individual circumstances in all twelve grievances,
one or two fairly typical cases be heard and decided. The parties
then should attempt to resolve the other cases in light of the rul-
ing on those test cases. Is that appropriate? I suggest that it is.
So much for the scenarios. As each of these scenarios was
presented, Noble Braden promptly commented that he saw noth-
ing wrong with that kind of suggestion by the arbitrator. I, in
turn, readily agreed with his main thesis that the arbitrator should
not himself try to assume a mediator's role on the merits of the
case, absent a joint request that he do so.
What, then, might constitute inappropriate and arguably im-
proper "mediation" by the arbitrator? Two kinds of conduct come
to mind. One would be exerting pressure on the parties to settle
the case following their negative response to any of the above-
described inquiries. The line between innocent inquiry and im-
proper pressure may be shadowy in some situations, but there is a
line, and arbitrators are well advised to be careful not to step over
it.
The other form of inappropriate conduct arises when the ar-
bitrator suggests to the parties specific proposals for settlement of
the grievance (unless the parties have mutually agreed that some
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proposals would be helpful). There may be exceptions, but in most
instances this is unwise, if not actually improper. However, if the
arbitrator stops short of making specific proposals, and merely dis-
cusses with the parties the practical consequences of various possi-
ble outcomes, there seems to be no impropriety involved.
I have not discussed the propriety of the arbitrator engaging
in what I would call "real" or "out-and-out" mediation without
the consent of the parties. This is not only improper but virtually
impossible as a practical matter. That kind of mediation typically
involves meeting separately with each side and acting as a go-be-
tween in the back-and-forth discussion of settlement terms. This,
of course, requires consenting parties.
I should not close this subject without mentioning a hybrid
process called "Med-Arb." Acceptance of this process is growing.
To use "Med-Arb," the parties expressly authorize the arbitrator
to act not only as mediator, but also authorize him to make final
and binding decisions when mediation fails to produce agreement.
The process may not be readily adaptable to most grievance arbi-
trations, but it has proven very effective in interest arbitrations. It
brings heavy pressure on both parties to work closely with the ar-
bitrator in seeking reasonable solutions, either by outright agree-
ment or by consent decisions. This ensures an outcome which is
largely acceptable to each side. In my opinion, "Med-Arb" is infi-
nitely preferable to another hybrid process called "Final Offer Se-
lection." The flaw in this latter process arises because the arbitra-
tor must award the total final proposal of one of the two sides,
thus virtually guaranteeing that the result will not be acceptable
to both sides.
I want to close by leaving with you what I consider to be a
classic description of what arbitration hearings were like in the
early days, immediately after the War Labor Board closed up
shop at the end of 1945. I began arbitrating about five years later.
Charles Killingsworth, who served with the War Labor Board and
later became a leading figure in academic circles at Michigan
State University, has been a leader in the arbitration profession
throughout the years. He gave this account at the opening of his
talk at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators:
In looking back at early beginnings, one must guard against
the rosy glow that often settles over a long-past experience that
had its moments or hours of anguish. But I truly believe that it
would be hard to overstate the excitement and the stimulation of
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being an arbitrator in that time of radiant morning three de-
cades ago.
First would come "The Call." It hardly counted, of course,
if the caller was only somebody from the War Labor Board. The
real thing was a call from a union or company man telling you
they had a case they wanted you to arbitrate. A lot of us sud-
denly realized that being wanted was the next best thing to be-
ing loved. Then came the matter of a date for a hearing. It was
always hard to resist the temptation to suggest tomorrow or the
day after. Dignity required the pretense that you were all
booked up for at least a week in advance. And then you had
somehow to restrain your impatience while waiting for "The
Hearing."
Almost every hearing produced some kind of incident that
was worth telling and retelling back home to admiring family
and friends. Several times I had to call a quick recess to prevent
a fist-fight in the hearing room. Once a quick-tempered advocate
stopped in midsentence, led out into the hall a member of his
own group who had been commenting all too audibly on the pro-
ceedings, and then knocked him flat on his back. Once I had to
call a recess because the hearing room was suddenly filled with
tear gas - not intentionally, but because of a threatened riot
outside. In a wartime shipyard, I held a week of hearings that
opened at 1:30 a.m. and closed shortly after daybreak. And then
there were the plant visits. I was constantly amazed by the con-
ditions that people would endure to earn a living - unbelievable
heat, unbelievable odors, unbelievable filth, unbelievable noise.
The most memorable experience of my early arbitration career
was standing inside a half-built steel ship with some 200 riveters
working on it.
After the excitement and the glamour of the hearing came
the morning-after feeling when you sat down to write the deci-
sion. You suddenly realized that the parties had not been very
helpful at the hearing. Once, after listening to a somewhat con-
fusing opening statement by a union representative, I asked,
"Mr. Jones, would you mind telling me what clause of the con-
tract you contend was violated?" He glared at me, and said,
"Well, Doc, what the hell do you think we're paying you for?"
The parties were usually pretty good at giving you the facts of
the case, but sometimes weak on contract interpretation. And so,
when you sat down and faced the necessity of rendering a deci-
sion, you began to realize that being an arbitrator involved not
only excitement and glamour but hours of lonely mental
anguish.
It is that anguish, I think, that partly accounts for the great
pleasure that arbitrators have always found in each other's com-
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pany - that, plus the shared feeling of working on the leading
edge of a new frontier. Of course, we were dimly aware that
there was a substantial history of arbitration before the 1940s,
and there were a few old pros around to remind us that we were
really rediscovering the wheel. The response of the new genera-
tion of arbitrators seemed to be, "Okay, but this is the very first
time I ever discovered the wheel!" And it is true, of course, that
we were involved almost entirely with parties and industries that
had had no prior experience with arbitration. The inexperienced
were leading the greenhorns.6
Thank you very much.
6. Killingsworth, Arbitration Then and Now, 25 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 11-13
(1973)(footnote omitted).
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